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FORRESTER v. CITY OF SAN DIEGO: IS PAIN COMPLIANCE AN
APPROPRIATE POLICE PRACTICE UNDER THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT?
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits
the government from engaging in an unreasonable search or seizure of its
citizens.' The United States Supreme Court has ruled that the Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness standard governs the examination of all
claims against law enforcement officers for using excessive force when
making an arrest.2 This standard requires "a careful balancing of 'the na-
ture and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment
interests' against the countervailing government interests at stake."'3 Gen-
1. U.S. CONSr. amend. IV. "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ... 
Id.
2. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). The Court made explicit
what they had made implicit in previous rulings, and held
that all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force-
deadly or not-in the course of an arrest... or other "seizure" of a free
citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its "reason-
ableness" standard .... Because the Fourth Amendment provides an
explicit textual source of constitutional protection against ... physically
intrusive governmental conduct, that Amendment... must be the guide
for analyzing these claims.
Id.
3. Id. at 396 (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985); United States
v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)); see Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654
(1979) (stating reasonableness standard usually requires that "an objective stan-
dard" should measure facts that establish intrusion "whether this be probable
cause or less stringent test"); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978)
(stating Fourth Amendment's standard of reasonableness based upon motivation
"to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions"
(quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)); United States v.
Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-19 (1977) (noting that "'[t]he Fourth Amendment
does not denounce all searches or seizures, but only such as are unreasonable' "
(quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925)); United States v. Marti-
nez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976) (discussing that "Court has weighed public
interest against Fourth Amendment interest of individual" (citation omitted));
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968) (discussing that "there is no ready test for
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or seize]
against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails" (citation omitted));
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964) (stating that "good faith on part of the arrest-
ing officer is not enough," when protecting Fourth Amendment rights (quoting
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959))); McDonald v. United States, 335
U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948) (stressing that without search warrant, those charged with
detection of crime and arrest of criminals would possess power to endanger pre-
cious right of privacy); Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149 (stating that "[t] he Fourth Amend-
ment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search
(1177)
1
Mitchell: Forrester v. City of San Diego: Is Pain Compliance an Appropriate
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1995
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40: p. 1177
erally, this balancing test involves considering the totality of the circum-
stances.4 The Court has stated that the reasonableness of a particular
seizure "depends on not only when a seizure is made, but also how it is
carried out."'5 In addition, the Court has long recognized that the right to
make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily entails some degree of
force or the threat thereof to accomplish the arrest.6
In Forrester v. City of San Diego,7 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the holding of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California which found that police officers
from the city of San Diego did not violate anti-abortion protesters' Fourth
Amendment rights.8 The demonstrators alleged that the city's police of-
ficers violated their Fourth Amendment right, against unreasonable
seizure, when the police employed "pain compliance" 9 techniques against
and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public inter-
ests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens").
4. Garner, 471 U.S. at 8-9. "To determine the constitutionality of a seizure,
[the Court] 'must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individ-
ual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental
interests alleged to justify the intrusion.' " Id. (citing Place, 462 U.S. at 703); see
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 n.12 (1981) (describing balancing of com-
peting interests as key principle of Fourth Amendment); Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654
(stating that "the permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged
by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against
its promotion of legitimate governmental interests"); Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at
555 (same); see also Camara, 387 U.S. at 536-37 (stating that "there can be no ready
test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search
against the invasion which the search entails"). The "[tlest of reasonableness
under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical
application." Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559
(1979)); see Garner, 471 U.S. at 8-9 (phrasing issue as "whether the totality of the
circumstances justifie [s] a particular sort of ... seizure").
5. Garner, 471 U.S. at 8; see United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975)
(stating that "[w] here only a few are singled out for a [n automobile] search, mo-
torists may find the searches especially offensive"); Terry, 392 U.S. at 28-31 (stating
officer did not violate person's Fourth Amendment rights because officer's investi-
gation did not go beyond scope of search allowed).
6. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (stating that circumstances dictate kind of force to
use); see Teny, 392 U.S. at 22-27 (concluding that "there must be a narrowly drawn
authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the po-
lice officer, where he [or she] has reason to believe that he [or she] is dealing with
an armed and dangerous individual").
7. 25 F.3d 804 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1104 (1995).
8. Id. at 805. The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California entered judgment upon jury verdict for the city of San Diego. Id. The
district court reasoned that the San Diego Police Department's pain compliance
policy represented a constitutional use of force in executing the arrests. Id.
9. " 'Pain compliance' is a catch-all phrase used to categorize a variety of pain-
inducing techniques available to officers to 'persuade' an uncooperative arrestee
to comply with their demands." Benjamin I. Whipple, Comment, The Fourth
Amendment and the Police Use of "Pain Compliance" Techniques on Nonviolent Arrestees,
28 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 177, 181 (1991).
For example, an officer may place his or her fingers firmly on a subject's
pressure points, may insert his or her fingers in a subject's nose and pull
1178
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 4 [1995], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol40/iss4/5
them during their arrest.10 The district court concluded that the city of
San Diego's policy regarding pain compliance did not violate the Constitu-
tion because the police officers did not use excessive force in effectuating
the arrests."
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit examined the police officers' use of
pain compliance under the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness test.12
Applying this test, the Ninth Circuit concluded that sufficient evidence
supported the jury verdict.' 3 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision that the officers "acted reasonably in using the
pain compliance techniques to arrest the demonstrators."' 4 The Ninth
in an upward direction, may twist the subject's arm(s), bend a subject's
finger(s) backward, and press the subject in a sensitive spot with the of-
ficer's baton. Depending on the technique, the pain induced can range
from mild discomfort to extreme and debilitating pain. The use of a
"nunchaku," a martial arts lethal weapon, is a particularly painful tech-
nique recently introduced to some police departments. The nunchaku
device modified for police use consists of two twelve-inch plastic handles
connected by a four-inch nylon cord. When the cord is torqued around
limbs, the extreme pressure and constricted circulation cause severe
pain.
Id. (citations omitted). This nunchaku device has recently developed into a mar-
tial arts weapon and used in B-movies of the Bruce Lee and Chuck Norris genre.
JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE
USE OF FORCE 166 (1993). "Nunchakus apparently found their way into American
policing in Thornton, Colorado, during the early 1980s. There, Officer Kevin
Orcutt, a First Degree Jukado Black Belt, developed and patented the Orcutt Police
Control Nunchaku ("OPN"), the device subsequently used against Rescue's dem-
onstrators." Id.
10. Forrester, 25 F.3d at 806. Specifically, the demonstrators protested the use
of nunchakus. Id.
11. Id. at 805.
12. Id. at 806. "[T] he 'reasonableness' inquiry in an excessive force case is an
objective one: the question is whether the officers' actions are 'objectively reason-
able' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them." Id. (quoting Gra-
ham v. O'Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989)); see Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97
(finding that "calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that
police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments-in circumstances
that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving."); Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028,
1033 (2d Cir.) (stating that " '[n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later seem
unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers... ' violates the Fourth Amend-
ment" (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
13. Forrester, 25 F.3d at 807. The Ninth Circuit stated that "whether the
amount of force used was reasonable is usually a question of fact to be determined
by the jury." Id. at 806 (quoting Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1206 (1992)). The court further stated, "[wie review
the jury's verdict to determine 'whether it is supported by substantial evidence,
that is, such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
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Circuit also affirmed the lower court's ruling without deciding the consti-
tutionality of the city's pain compliance policy. 15
Four reasons demonstrate the importance of the Ninth Circuit's hold-
ing. First, the decision gives the police authorization to inflict certain
forms of severe pain on peaceful demonstrators. 16 Second, contrary to
previous Supreme Court rulings, this decision has shifted the balance be-
tween individual and governmental interests in favor of the government. 17
Third, the ruling may significantly chill the right to free speech, under the
First Amendment, when demonstrators face potential arrest.' 8 Fourth,
15. Id. at 808. By finding that the officers did not use unreasonable force, the
jury concluded that "neither the officers nor, implicitly, the policy, caused any dep-
rivation of constitutional rights." Id. The court reasoned that the jury's conclusion
rendered moot the question of whether the city's policy authorized the use of con-
stitutionally excessive force. Id.; see City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799
(1986) (ruling that "[i]f a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands
of the individual police officer, the fact that the departmental regulations might
have authorized the use of constitutionally excessive force is quite beside the
point"); e.g., Hinton v. City of Elwood, 997 F.2d 774, 782 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding
that because police officers' conduct did not violate arrestee's Fourth Amendment
rights court could not impose any liability against city); Robinson v. City of St.
Charles, 972 F.2d 974, 977 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding plaintiffs had no § 1983 claim
against city because jury determined that police officers did not violate plaintiffs'
constitutional rights).
16. See Forrester, 25 F.3d at 805 (upholding jury finding that police did not use
excessive force in executing pain compliance techniques against passive anti-abor-
tion demonstrators). After Forrester, municipalities may have significant latitude
with respect to the amount of force police can use against an arrestee. "Some
officers have been criticized for manhandling demonstrators and causing injuries
in recent anti-abortion protests at which nunchakus were used." Bob Pool, The
LAPD's Idea Man: Officer's Latest Gadget Is Designed to Put the Squeeze on Crime, LA.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 1990, at B3. As evidence demonstrates that police have become
more sereptitious in their techniques, the article quotes the inventor of a tweezer-
like device: "Best of all, it does it with a subtleness that is missing when officers
whack at suspects with night sticks or twist controversial, menacing-looking martial
arts weapons around their wrists .... Image is important in police work .... You
don't want something that gives the image of overkill." Id.
17. See Graham v. O'Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 399 (1989) (ruling that "[t]he
Fourth Amendment inquiry is one of 'objective reasonableness'. . and subjective
concepts.., have no proper place in that inquiry"); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S.
1, 11 (1985) (stating "use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony sus-
pects.., is constitutionally unreasonable. It is not better that all felony suspects
die than that they escape"); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968) (stating search
done in public "is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may
inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken
lightly").
18. The fact that prospective demonstrators might subject themselves to this
kind of force may discourage many of them from participating in demonstrations.
See Forrester, 25 F.3d at 809 (Kleinfeld,J., dissenting) (stating that because "only the
pro-life demonstrators of Operation Rescue, not other demonstrators, have been
subjected to a policy of arrest by deliberate infliction of severe pain," the policy
raises First Amendment questions).
1180
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few courts have clearly decided the constitutionality of governmental pain
compliance policies.1 9
This Note examines the Ninth Circuit's decision in Forrester in light of
prior Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 20 Part II discusses the relevant
case law regarding law enforcement's use of excessive force and the
Supreme Court's reasonableness test.2 1 Part III describes the underlying
facts in the Forrester case.2 2 Part IV explores the reasoning behind the ma-
jority and the dissenting opinions in Forrester.2 3 Finally, Part V analyzes
the decision in light of past Supreme Court opinions.2 4 This Note con-
cludes that a "pain compliance" policy against passive arrestees violates
Fourth Amendment precedents by ignoring the tantamount importance
of certain individual rights under the Constitution.25
II. BACKGROUND: CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEIZURE
The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution prohibits the police
from engaging in unreasonable seizures. 26 The process of seizure or
arrest always involves the use or threat of force.27 The Supreme Court
19. Although the Court has not specifically ruled on this issue, it has made
clear the importance of individual interests in an arrest context. See Terry, 392 U.S.
at 24-25 (stating that "even limited search of outer clothing for weapons consti-
tutes a severe . . .intrusion upon cherished personal security"); Henry v. United
States, 361 U.S. 98, 101 (1959) (noting that "[a]rrest on mere suspicion collides
violently with the basic human right of liberty").
20. For a discussion of relevant Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, see supra
notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of the legal framework with regard to police use of exces-
sive force and the reasonableness test, see infra notes 26-65 and accompanying
text.
22. For a discussion of the facts in the Forrester decision, see infra notes 66-86
and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of the rationale behind the majority and dissenting opin-
ions in Forrester, see infra notes 87-136 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of the relevance of past Supreme Court decisions to For-
rester, see infra notes 26-65 and accompanying text.
25. For a discussion of the importance of individual rights under the Fourth
Amendment, see supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated ...." Id.; Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395-96 (1989);
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1985); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696,
703 (1983); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979); United States v. Mar-
tinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554-55 (1976); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,
418-19 (1976); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111-14 (1975); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 149-53 (1925).
27. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; see also Garner, 471 U.S. at 11 (stating that
"[w] here the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of
serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally
unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force"); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
22-27 (1968) (finding that "law enforcement officers need to protect themselves
and other prospective victims [from] violence").
1995] NOTE 1181
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developed the framework for examining arrest/seizure cases in Tennessee
v. Garne2 8 and Tery v. Ohio.29 Garner involved a state statute which pro-
vided that "if, after [a police officer] has given notice of the intention to
arrest [a criminal suspect], he either flee[s] or forcibly resist[s], the of-
ficer may use all the necessary means to effect the arrest. °30 Acting under
this authority, police officers shot and killed a minor who fled after the
police ordered him to halt.3 ' The shooting occurred in the backyard of a
house that the police suspected him of burglarizing.32 The minor's father
filed an action under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 187133 (sec-
tion 1983) seeking damages for violations of his son's Fourth Amendment
right of freedom from unreasonable seizure.3 4
The Supreme Court invalidated the statute "insofar as it authorizes
the use of deadly force against . . . an [apparently unarmed, non-
dangerous] fleeing suspect."35 The Court ruled that the police must use
force reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.3 6 In evaluating
the totality of the circumstances, courts must employ a balancing test to
weigh the competing individual and governmental interests.3 7
An individual subjected to police brutality may bring a cause of action
against the government under section 1983.38 The Supreme Court has
28. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
Whenever an officer restrains the freedom of a person to walk away, he
[or she] has seized that person. While it is not always clear just when
minimal police interference becomes a seizure ... there can be no ques-
tion that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to
the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 7 (citations omitted).
29. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Court, inquiring into whether the Fourth Amend-
ment applied to the facts, stated that "[i] t must be recognized that whenever a
police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has
'seized' that person." Id. at 16.
30. Garner, 471 U.S. at 4 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 (1982)).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 3-4.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). For a detailed discussion of a § 1983 action, see
infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
34. Garner, 471 U.S. at 5.
35. Id. at 11.
36. Id. at 8-9. The question involves "whether the totality of the circum-
stances justifie[s] a particular sort of ... seizure." Id.; see also Michigan v. Sum-
mers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 n.12 (1981) (stating that "key principle of Fourth
Amendment is reasonableness-balancing of competing interests" (citation omit-
ted)); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967) (stating that "there
can be no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the
need to search against the invasion which the search entails").
37. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989); Garner, 471 U.S. at 7-8;
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). The primary cause of action available to the
alleged victim of police brutality lies under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 as codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Whipple, supra note 9, at 185. Section 1983 provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinace, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, sub-
1182 [Vol. 40: p. 1177
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stated that "the statutory grant of federal jurisdiction over Section 1983
suits indicates that Congress, at least, continues to adhere to the belief that
police abuse is a sufficient threat to constitutional rights to warrant a 'fed-
eral right in federal courts.' 39 An allegation must necessarily involve a
violation of rights protected by the Constitution and not merely violations
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person with the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, priv-
ileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. "In addressing an excessive force claim brought under § 1983,
analysis begins by identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed by
the alleged application of force." Garner, 490 U.S. at 394 (citation omitted); see
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S 137, 140 (1979) (stating that "[t]he first inquiry in any
§ 1983 suit.., is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right 'secured by the
Constitution and laws' ").
The Court has consistently ruled that § 1983 "is not itself a source of substan-
tive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by
those parts of the United States Constitution and federal statutes that, § 1983 de-
scribes." Baker, 443 U.S. at 144 n.3; see Garner, 490 U.S. at 393-94 (same).
"Criminal liability also exists for police use of excessive force under 18 U.S.C.
§ 242 [1994], which makes it unlawful for anyone acting under the color of law to
deprive an inhabitant of the United States of any federally-protected right." Whip-
ple, supra note 9, at 185 n.47. "The prosecution . . .must establish an officer's
subjective intent to use excessive force, and the standard of proof is beyond a rea-
sonable doubt." Id. In contrast, a § 1983 claim need not inquire into the subjec-
tive mind of the officer. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 (stating that "[ain officer's evil
intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively rea-
sonable use of force; nor will an officer's good intentions make an objectively un-
reasonable use of force constitutional").
39. Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1499 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961)).
"By the plain terms of section 1983 two-and only two-allegations are re-
quired in order to state a cause of action under [42 U.S.C. § 1983]. First,
the plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him [or her] of a
federal right. Second, he [or she] must allege that the person who has
deprived him of that right acted under color of state . . .law."
Soto v. City of Sacramento, 567 F. Supp. 662, 669 (E.D. Cal. 1983) (quoting Gomez
v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) (alterations in original)).
"Each year, 20,000 to 30,000 § 1983 actions are filed against law enforcement
officials." N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1985, at 74 (quoting Wayne Schmidt, Executive Di-
rector, Americans for Effective Law Enforcement). The United States Commission
on Civil Rights reported that it received "a continuing flood of complaints and
letters of concern" regarding "police misconduct in the context of public non-
violent demonstrations." Whipple, supra note 9, at 177-78 (quoting Allegations of
Police Misconduct in the Context of Non-Violent Public Demonstrations: Briefing Before the
U.S. Comm'n on CivilRights, Sept. 15, 1989, at 2 [hereinafter Allegations]). Congress
also received varying reports of police brutality in encounters with nonviolent
rotesters. 135 CONG. Rxc. S11,358-60 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1989) (statement of
en. Armstrong). In response to the growing problem, Senator Armstrong
brought complaints of police behavior to the attention of his colleagues and intro-
duced an amendment to the Appropriations Act for the VA, HUD and various
independent agencies. Department of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban
Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-144, § 519, 103 Stat. 874 (1989) [hereinafter Appropriations Act]. The amend-
ment states:
7
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of duties under tort law. 40 Hence, a violation of an individual's Fourth
Amendment right of freedom from excessive governmental force gives rise
to an action under section 1983.41
A. What Is Unreasonable Force Under the Fourth Amendment?
The Supreme Court has analyzed claims of excessive police force in
executing an arrest under the Fourth Amendment's "objective reasonable-
ness" standard. 42 The Court noted that "the Fourth Amendment provides
an explicit textual source of constitutional protection[s]" against the gov-
None of the funds appropriated under Tide II of this Act under the head-
ing entitled Community Planning and Development, Community Devel-
opment Grants, to any department, agency, or instrumentality of the
United States may be obligated or expended to any municipality that fails
to adopt and enforce a policy prohibiting the use of excessive force by law
enforcement agencies within the jurisdiction of said municipality against
any individuals engaged in nonviolent civil rights demonstrations.
Id. The provision had the simple purpose of curbing police misconduct. 135
CONG. REc. H7201, H7216 (Oct. 18, 1989) [hereinafter Joint Report]. "Such mis-
conduct by official governmental instrumentalities is exceedingly objectionable
and offensive, and must be condemned and curbed with the imposition of effec-
tive policies to prevent any further occurences." Id.
40. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979) (stating that plaintiff must
seek remedy for tort type of injury in state court under traditional tort-law princi-
ples, while § 1983 imposes liability for violations of rights protected by Constitu-
tion); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (stating "[m]edical
malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim
is a prisoner").
41. Graham, 490 U.S. at 393. The Graham Court stated that "many courts have
seemed to assume.., that there is a generic 'right' to be free from excessive force,
grounded not in any particular constitutional provision but rather in 'basic princi-
ples of § 1983 jurisprudence.'" Id. (quoting Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380, 382
(1987)).
42. Id. at 394-99. In Graham, the Court rejected the standard set forth by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Johnson v. Glick, 481
F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973). In Johnson, the court did not
apply the Fourth nor Eighth Amendment, "the two most textually obvious sources
of constitutional protection against physically abusive governmental conduct."
Graham, 490 U.S. at 392. Instead, the Johnson court "looked to 'substantive due
process,' holding that 'quite apart from any 'specific' of the Bill of Rights, applica-
tion of undue force by law enforcement officers deprives a suspect of liberty with-
out due process of law.' " Id. at 392-93 (quoting Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1032). The
Johnson court "set forth four factors to guide courts in determining 'whether the
constitutional line ha[d] been crossed' by a particular use of force." Id. at 393
(quoting Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033). The four factors a court must consider in
determining when the excessive use of force supports a cause of action under
§ 1983 include:
(1) the need for the application of force; (2) the relationship between
that need and the amount of force that was used; (3) the extent of the
injury inflicted; and (4) "[w]hether the force was applied in a good faith
effort to maintain and restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for
the very purpose of causing harm."
Graham, 490 U.S. at 390 (quoting Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033).
[Vol. 40: p. 11771184
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ernment's use of excessive physical intrusion.4 Under this standard, the
subjective intent of an arresting officer has no bearing on the determina-
tion of reasonableness." In Graham v. Connor,45 the Supreme Court char-
acterized an excessive force claim arising in the context of an arrest "as
one invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment. '46 Before Gra-
ham, many courts followed the standard in Johnson v. Glick,4 7 which fo-
cused on the perpetrating officer's subjective intent.4a
43. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. The Graham Court reaffirmed the Fourth
Amendment analysis it proposed in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985), and
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). For a further discussion of this issue, see supra
notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
44. In Johnson, the Second Circuit adopted the "shocks the conscience" test as
the constitutional line. 481 F.2d at 1033. The Johnson court founded its determi-
nation on the test set forth in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1951), where
police officers obtained evidence by extracting the contents of a suspect's stomach.
Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033. The Court overruled a lower court finding and pro-
nounced the police practice unconstitutional because it "shocks the conscience."
Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.
45. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
46. Id. at 394. For a further discussion of the Graham standard, see supra
notes 2-6 and accompanying text. "A 'seizure' triggering the Fourth Amendment's
protections occurs only when government actors have, 'by means of physical force
or show of authority .... in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.' " Graham,
490 U.S. at 395 n.10 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16) (alterations in original);
see Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989) ("A seizure occurs even
when an unintended person or thing is the object of the detention or taking, but
the detention or taking itself must be willful. This is explicit in the word 'seizure,'
which can hardly be applied to an unknowing act." (citations omitted)); Byars v.
United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33 (1927) (stating that Fourth Amendment addresses
"misuse of power"). After conviction, the Eighth Amendment "serves as the pri-
mary source of substantive protection ... in cases.., where the deliberate use of
force is challenged as excessive and unjustified." Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,
327 (1986); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103, 106 (1976) (stating that
"government . . . [has] obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is
punishing by incarceration"); Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172, 173 (1952). The Court has
held repugnant to the Eighth Amendment, punishments which do not comply
with "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing soci-
ety." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 1693 (1976) (stating that "an assessment of contemporary values concern-
ing the infliction of a challenged sanction is relevant to the application of the
Eighth Amendment"); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) (stating
that cruel and unusual punishments "is not fastened to the obsolete but may ac-
quire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a human justice").
47. 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
48. Id.; see Rhodes v. Robinson, 612 F.2d 766, 772 (3d Cir. 1979) (adopting
"shocks the conscience" test); Jones v. Marshall, 528 F.2d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1975)
(stating that one consideration concerns "'whether force was applied in a good
faith effort . . . or maliciously or sadistically.'" (alteration in original) (quoting
Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033)). In Johnson, the Second Circuit addressed a prisoner's
§ 1983 damages claim that a guard had assaulted him without justification. 481
F.2d at 1033-34. The detainee brought a complaint against the prison warden al-
leging that, while checking into the detention house, an officer grabbed his collar,
struck him in the head and threatened him by saying "I'll kill you, old man, I'll
break you in half." Id. at 1029-30. The officer held the detainee in two different
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In Johnson, Judge Friendly applied neither a Fourth nor an Eighth
Amendment analysis to the defendant's claim.4 9 Instead, Judge Friendly
adopted the "shocks the conscience" test to determine the constitutional-
ity of police officers' actions. 50 In Johnson, a pretrial detainee claimed that
a guard had assaulted him without justification.5 1 Judge Friendly relied
on the Supreme Court decision in Rochin v. Calfornia,52 which used the
Due Process Clause to invalidate a conviction based upon evidence ob-
tained by pumping the defendant's stomach.5 3 Judge Friendly reasoned
that if a police officer's administration of force which "shocks the con-
science" could justify setting aside a conviction, then the correctional of-
ficer's use of similar excessive force also supports a due process action
under section 1983.
54
holding cells for a total of four hours before he received medical treatment by a
doctor. Id. at 1030.
49. Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1030-32; see Graham, 490 U.S. at 392. The Graham
Court, in analyzing the Johnson decision, found:
Judge Friendly did not apply the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unu-
sual Punishments Clause to the detainee's claim for two reasons. First, he
thought that the Eighth Amendment's protections did not attach until
after conviction and sentence. 481 F.2d at 1032. This view was confirmed
by Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977) ("Eighth Amend-
ment scrutiny is appropriate only after the State has complied with the
constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecu-
tions"). Second, he expressed doubt whether a "spontaneous attack" by a
prison guard, done without the authorization of prison officials, fell
within the traditional Eighth Amendment definition of "punishments."
481 F.2d at 1032. Although Judge Friendly gave no reason for not analyz-
ing the detainee's claim under the Fourth Amendment's prohibition
against "unreasonable ... seizures" of the person, his refusal to do so was
apparently based on a belief that the protections of the Fourth Amend-
ment did not extend to pretrial detainees. See id. at 1033 (noting that
"most of the courts faced with challenges to the conditions.of pretrial
detention have primarily based their analysis directly on the due process
clause").
Graham, 490 U.S. at 392 n.6.
50. Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033; see Graham, 490 U.S. at 393. The Johnson court
created a test to gauge police conduct:
In determining whether the constitutional line has been crossed, a court
must look to such factors as the need for the application of force, the
relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used, the
extent of injury inflicted, and whether force was applied in a good faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the
very purpose of causing harm.
Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033 (emphasis added). For a discussion of another court
adopting the "shocks the conscience" test, see supra note 48.
51. Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1029-30.
52. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
53. Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1032-33.
54. Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1032-33.
1186 [Vol. 40: p. 1177
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The Graham Court, however, rejected the standard utilized by Judge
Friendly.55 The Court explicitly adopted the "objective reasonableness"
standard it had implicitly embraced in previous cases.5 6 The Court also
emphasized that the Due Process Clause5 7 represented an inappropriate
55. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989); see also Tennessee v. Garner,
471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (stating that reasonableness requirement of Fourth Amend-
ment applies to seizure of deadly force); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968) (rul-
ing that parties may not introduce evidence discovered by seizures and searches
not reasonably related in scope to justifying their initiation). In Graham, the plain-
tiff commenced an action under § 1983, alleging that the police used excessive
force while making the investigatory stop, in violation of his rights under the Four-
teenth Amendment. Graham, 490 U.S. at 390. Graham, a diabetic man, asked a
friend to drive him to a local convenience store in order to buy orange juice to
counteract an insulin reaction. Id. at 388. When he arrived at the store, he no-
ticed a long line at the check-out counter. Id. at 388-89. Based on this potential
delay, he ran quickly out of the store and asked his friend to drive him to a friend's
house to get orange juice. Id. at 389. A police officer saw Graham hastily enter
and leave the store. Id. Acting on these suspicions, the officer pulled the car over
and called for backup. Id. Graham's driver told the officer that Graham had suf-
fered from a sugar reaction. Id. Graham then briefly passed out. Id. Ignoring
Graham's explanation, one officer rolled him over and cuffed his hands tightly
behind his back. Id. Another officer said, "I've seen a lot of people with sugar
diabetes that never acted like this. Ain't nothing wrong with the M.F. but drunk.
Lock the S.B. up." Id. The officers refused to check Graham's wallet for a diabetic
decal, shoved his face down against the car, threw him headfirst into the police car
and prevented Graham's friend from giving him orange juice. Id. During the en-
counter, Graham suffered "a broken foot, cuts on his wrists, a bruised forehead,
and an injured shoulder; he also claims to have developed a loud ringing in his
right ear that continues to this day." Id. at 390. For a further discussion of the
Graham decision, see supra notes 2-6.
56. Graham, 490 U.S. at 388. For a further discussion of the objective reasona-
bleness standard, see supra note 17.
57. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Id. § 1.
"Although Judge Friendly [in Johnson v. Glick] gave no reason for not analyz-
ing the detainee's claim under the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against 'un-
reasonable.., seizures' of the person, his refusal to do so was apparently based on
a belief that the protections of the Fourth Amendment did not extend to pretrial
detainees." Graham, 490 U.S. at 392 n.6. (alterations in original); seeJohnson, 481
F.2d at 1033 (noting that "most of the courts faced with challenges to the condi-
tions of pretrial detention have primarily based their analysis directly on the due
process clause").
"A 'seizure' triggering the Fourth Amendment's protections occurs only when
government actors have, 'by means of physical force or show of authority .... in
some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.' " Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10 (quot-
ing Teny, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16); see Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596
(1989) (stating that seizure occurs only when detention or taking itself is willful).
The Court also observed that "if a parked and unoccupied police car slips its brake
and pins a passerby against a wall, it is likely that a tort has occurred, but not a
11
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constitutional provision for analyzing excessive force claims.58 Further,
the Court examined all of the circumstances to determine the reasonable-
ness of an officer's conduct.59 Accordingly, the Court implied that the
facts of each case significantly impact a decision involving this question. 60
violation of the Fourth Amendment." Id. For more cases that have analyzed exces-
sive force claims under the Due Process Clause, see Franklin v. Aycock, 795 F.2d
1253, 1258-59 (6th Cir. 1986) (concluding that unjustified beatings by prison offi-
cials violate substantive due process rights); McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780,
784-86 (9th Cir. 1986) (concurrently analyzed under Eighth Amendment); Burton
v. Livingston, 791 F.2d 97, 99-101 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that prison guard's use
of unprovoked death threats and racial epithets violated prisoner's rights under
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses ; Bates v. Jean, 745 F.2d 1146, 1151-52
(7th Cir. 1984) (concurrently analyzed under Eighth Amendment); Freeman v.
Fanzen, 695 F.2d 485, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1982) (stating that Due Process Clause pro-
vides prisoners cause of action for physical injury inflicted by prison guard's use of
excessive force), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1214 (1983); Martinez v. Rosado, 614 F.2d
829, 831-32 (2d Cir. 1980) (utilizing Due Process Clause in assessing action against
prison guard for alleged beating of inmate); Meredith v. Arizona, 523 F.2d 481,
482-84 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that Due Process Clause provides cause of action
for prison guard's unprovoked assault and battery upon prisoner). For cases
which have analyzed excessive force claims without identifying any specific consti-
tutional provision, see Massop v. Coughlin, 770 F.2d 299, 301 (2d Cir. 1985) (ana-
lyzing claim of intentional infliction of injury under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Hodges v.
Stanley, 712 F.2d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 1983) (reversing dismissal of alleged excessive
force under Johnson standard); King v. Blankenship, 636 F.2d 70, 72-73 (4th Cir.
1980) (analyzing claim of unjustified infliction of bodily harm under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983); Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80, 95-96 (1st Cir. 1979) (analyzing prisoner's
claims of excessive force by prison guards under "reasonable guard" standard),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035 (1980). In all of these categories of cases, the circuits
applied the Johnson factors in the same manner. R. Wilson Freyermuth, Rethinking
Excessive Force, 1987 DuKE LJ. 692, 696. "[C]areful analysis of the Supreme Court's
decisions in Whitley [v. Albers 475 U.S. 312 (1986)] and [Tennessee v.] Garner
[471 U.S. 1 (1985)] compels the conclusion that the continued application of the
Johnson standard in all excessive force cases is incorrect." Id. In Whitley, the Court
addressed the limitations that the Eighth Amendment places on an official's use of
force against a prisoner. 475 U.S. at 314-28. The case involved the shooting of a
prisoner by prison officials attempting to free hostages taken during a prison riot.
Id. at 316. The Court rejected the prisoner's claim that the shooting violated the
Eighth Amendment, because the central requirement in an Eighth Amendment
violation involves the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Id. at 324. Ad-
ditionally, this standard applies to all Eighth Amendment cases. Id. at 319.
58. Graham, 490 U.S. at 393-94.
59. Id. at 396. Determining whether the particular force used to make an
arrest "is 'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing
of 'the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment
interests' against the countervailing governmental interests at stake." Id. (quoting
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)). "The calculus of reasonableness
must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make
split-second judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly
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B. Graham ' Balancing Approach
The Graham Court articulated several factors to consider when gaug-
ing the reasonableness of police conduct in the arrest context.6 1 These
factors break down into five categories: (1) individual rights; (2) the
countervailing governmental interests at stake; (3) the totality of the cir-
cumstances; (4) the on-the-scene perspective; and (5) an objective ap-
praisal regardless of subjective motive.62  This rule of objective
reasonableness considers, among other factors, the nature and severity of
the crime, the degree of resistance, and the split-second nature of on-the-
scene decision-making. 63 The Ninth Circuit does not require the subjec-
tive and difficult-to-prove element of malice.64 By eliminating the re-
quired showing of malice or intent, a defendant will more likely sustain an
excessive force claim pursuant to Graham than under the old Johnson v.
Glick standard.65
III. FAcTs: FORRESTFJR V. 72Y OF SAN DEGO
In Forrester, the San Diego police department discovered that Opera-
tion Rescue planned to stage several anti-abortion demonstrations in the
city.6 6 Based on the nature of these demonstrations, San Diego Police
Chief Burgreen adopted a policy for dispersing and arresting the demon-
61. Id.
62. Id.; see also Whipple, supra note 9, at 192 (stating that objective reasonable-
ness, steered by balancing certain factors, creates "lower threshold of liability").
63. Whipple, supra note 9, at 192; see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9
(1984) (finding question of reasonableness involves "whether the totality of the
circumstances justified a particular sort of ... seizure"); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 559 (1979) (stating that test of reasonableness does not have precise defini-
tion or mechanical application).
64. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. Malice represents:
[t]he intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse,
with an intent to inflict an injury or under circumstances that the law will
imply an evil intent. A condition of mind which prompts a person to do a
wrongful act willfully, that is, on purpose, to the injury of another, or to
do intentionally a wrongful act toward another without justification or
excuse.
BLACK's LAw DicrIoNAuR' 956 (6th ed. 1990). "Malice ... embraces the state of
mind with which one intentionally commits a wrongful act without legal justifica-
tion or excuse. It may be inferred from circumstances which show 'a wanton and
depraved spirit, a mind bent on evil mischief without regard to its consequences.' "
United States v. Boise, 916 F.2d 497, 500 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v.
Celestine, 510 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 934 (1991)).
65. Whipple, supra note 9, at 192.
66. Forrester v. City of San Diego, 25 F.3d 804, 805 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 1104 (1995). Members of Operation Rescue stage-plan "rescue" demon-
strations at abortion clinics nationwide throughout the country. Id. at 805 n.1. In
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993), the Court held
that § 1985(3) does not provide a federal cause of action against a person ob-
structing access to abortion clinics. Id. The Court reasoned that opposition to
abortion lacks the severity of race discrimination because there is no "otherwise
class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus [underlying] the conspirators' ac-
1995] NOTE 1189
13
Mitchell: Forrester v. City of San Diego: Is Pain Compliance an Appropriate
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1995
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40: p. 1177
strators who trespassed on the medical clinics.6 7 Specifically, the policy
guidelines required the police first to verbally warn the demonstrators that
they could avoid arrest by leaving the premises. 68 After this verbal warn-
ing, the police would arrest those refusing to disperse and provide them
with another opportunity to move voluntarily.69 Finally, if these steps
tion." Id. at 759 (quoting Griffen v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)). Sec-
tion 1985(3) provides:
[i]f two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire, or go in dis-
guise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of
the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities
under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the consti-
tuted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all
persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; or
if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or
threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his [or her]
support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election
of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice Presi-
dent, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any
citizen in person or property on account of such support or advocacy; in
any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons
engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the
object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his [or her] per-
son or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privi-
lege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may
have an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or
deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1994).
Justice O'Connor dissented in Bray and stated that "[t]he purpose of these
'rescue' demonstrations is to disrupt operations at the target clinic and ... ulti-
mately to cause the clinic to cease operations." Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 780 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting). To achieve this goal, the demonstrators "trespass on clinic property
and physically block access to the clinic, preventing patients, as well as physicians
and medical staff, from entering the clinic to render or receive medical or counsel-
ing services." Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
"A 'veteran' Operation Rescue activist, testifying before the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights, described Operation Rescue as: a grass roots
movement in this country, made up of people from every religious back-
ground and every social and ethnic status, who come together prayerfully,
passively, and nonviolently, motivated to rescue the lives of innocent chil-
dren that they believe are going to be slaughtered unless they intervene
and prevent that slaughter."
Whipple, supra note 9, at 182 n.31 (quoting Allegations, supra note 39, at 32 (testi-
mony of Mr. Chet Gallagher)).
67. Forrester, 25 F.3d at 805. This apparently represented the first time in
American police history that the San Diego Police Department used nunchakus
against nonviolent participants in a peaceful demonstration. SKOLNICK & FYFE,
supra note 9, at 166. By using nunchakus, the police broke one demonstrator's
arm and injured four or five others. Id. "In June [of that same year, the Los Ange-
les Police Department] went.., one better by using nunchakus against Rescuers
vigorously enough to break bones and cause sprains and nerve, tendon, ligament,
and soft tissue damage to several Rescue demonstrators." Id. For a further discus-
sion on nunchakus, see SKOLNICK & FEE, supra note 9, at 166-71.
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failed, the police would remove the remaining demonstrators with "pain
compliance techniques"70 involving the application of enough pain to co-
erce movement.
7 1
Pursuant to these instructions, the police officers attempted to re-
move the demonstrators. 72 Nevertheless, the demonstrators remained
seated, refused to move and refused to bear weight. 73 The court labeled
this type of activity as "passive resistance." 74 At the first demonstration,
the officers first used the "drag and carry" approach. 7 5 After the "pain
compliance unit" arrived, however, the police officers employed the pain
compliance techniques exclusively.7 6 All arrestees made complaints of
70. For a further discussion of pain compliance techniques, see supra note 9.
71. Forrester, 25 F.3d at 805. "Although San Diego police officers generally
have discretion either to use pain compliance or to drag and carry arrestees,
[Chief] Burgreen's policy absolutely prohibited officers from using the drag and
carry method." Id. Chief Burgreen changed the policy for two reasons: (1) "he
wanted to prevent the back injuries that multiple dragging and carrying causes to
police and arrestees", and (2) "he wanted to maximize police control over the
large crowds he anticipated." Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. The California legislature has enacted statutes which make "passively re-
sisting" arrest, by going limp, a violation of the Penal Code. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 148(a) (1988 & Supp. 1995) ("[E]very person who willfully resists, delays, or ob-
structs any public officer or peace officer or an emergency medical technician ...
in the discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of his or her office.., is punish-
able .... "). Courts have construed "willful resistance" to include "passive resist-
ance." See, e.g., People v. Schehr, 232 N.E.2d 566, 568-69 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967)
(finding "sit-in" participant guilty of resisting police officer by refusing to walk
upon being arrested); People ex rel. Howell v. Knight, 228 N.Y.S.2d 981, 985-86
(1962) (holding that defendant who resisted arrest by laying on sidewalk and refus-
ing to move violated penal law). In In reBacon, 49 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1966), the court
held that the University of California at Berkeley students participating in a polit-
ical demonstration violated § 148. Id. at 333. The court held that "a person who
goes limp and thereby requires the arresting officer to drag or bodily lift and carry
him in order to effect his arrest causes such a delay and obstruction to a lawful
arrest as to constitute the offense of resisting an officer as defined in Section 148."
Id. "In ... the LAPD's own tape of eighteen numbered uses of nunchakus against
demonstrators was shot with the advantage of closer proximity to its subjects and
shows that most demonstrators apparently resisted only by writhing and screaming
in pain." SKOLNICK & FyFE, supra note 9, at 167.
75. Forrester, 25 F.3d at 805-06.
76. Id. at 806. In John v. City of Los Angeles, No. 89-4766 AWT (C.D. Cal.July
17, 1991), police applied pain compliance to Operation Rescue demonstrators. In
that case,
Rescue's attorneys were convinced that their clients were singled out by
the LAPD for especially brutal treatment and that nunchakus were used
to teach their clients a painful lesson rather than to serve any legitimate
police purpose. The attorneys were correct. Rescue certainly was singled
out: Despite subsequent demonstrations by other groups for other
causes, nunchakus have been used only against Rescue in Los Angeles
(and in San Diego as well) .... Several Rescuers claim that arresting
officers expressed the hope that causing them great pain with the
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various injuries to their hands and arms including bruises, a pinched
nerve and a broken wrist.77
After the anti-abortion demonstrators filed suit against the city, a mag-
istrate judge upheld the constitutionality of the pain compliance tech-
niques and granted summary judgment in favor of the city.78 The judge,
however, allowed the case to proceed to the jury to determine whether any
particular uses of force violated the Fourth Amendment.79 After viewing
the videotaped arrests, the jury concluded that none of the arrests in-
volved excessive force and therefore found in favor of the city.80 After
denying aJNOV81 motion, the court entered judgment on the verdict for
the city.8 2 The demonstrators, then, filed a timely appeal.8 3
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's verdict.8 4 The
court determined that ample evidence supported "the jury's conclusion
SKOLNIcK & FvrF, supra note 9, at 167-68. Perhaps, the most revealing evidence
illustrating the motives for using the nunchakus against Operation Rescue demon-
strators involves two pieces of Chief Daryl Gates' deposition in the John case:
So you say [Operation Rescue demonstrators] are not anti-police, but cer-
tainly they have demonstrated in every way, shape or form their unwilling-
ness to sit down and talk to us, their unwillingness to tell us where they
were going to be.
The tactics that they use in other cities of thwarting police tactics, all
of those things suggest to me that they were not willing to do-to cooper-
ate in any way .... [N]o consideration was given by any of the people
involved in these demonstrations, and in my judgment, it almost bor-
dered on arrogance which, I doubt, is a Christian concept.
Id. at 169 (quoting Daryl Gates, Nov. 21, 1990 deposition in John v. City of Los
Angeles, No. 89-4766 AWT (C.D. Cal. July 17, 1991) at 40-42).
77. Forrester, 25 F.3d at 806. For a further discussion of the injuries sustained,




81. JNOV is the abbreviation for judgment non obstante veredicto. 'Judgment
notwithstanding the verdict is defined as judgment entered by order of court for
the plaintiff (or defendant) although there has been a verdict for the defendant(or plaintiff)." BLACK's LAW DICrIONARY 1055 (6th ed. 1990). See, e.g., FED. R. Crv.
P. 50.
82. Forrester, 25 F.3d at 806.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 807. The jurors not only heard testimony from the numerous of-
ficers and demonstrators, but also watched the entire videotape of the arrests and
repeatedly observed excerpts of the tape throughout the trial. Id. The district
court noted:
the videotape created an extensive evidentiary record: "Thanks to video-
taped records of the actual events, plus the testimony of witnesses on
both sides, the jury had more than a sufficient amount of evidence
presented to them from which they could formulate their verdicts....
The extensive use of video scenes of exactly what took place removed
much argument and interpretation of the facts themselves."
Id. (citation omitted)
In Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1206
(1992), the Ninth Circuit ruled that "[w] hether the amount of force used was rea-
sonable is usually a question of fact to be determined by the jury." Id. at 1135
1192 [Vol. 40: p. 1177
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that the officers acted reasonably in using pain compliance techniques to
arrest the demonstrators." 85 While affirming the jury's verdict in favor of
the city, the Ninth Circuit left open the question of the constitutionality of
the city's "pain compliance" policy. 86
IV. ANALYSIS.
A. Majority Opinion
In Forrester, a majority of the court concluded that ample evidence
existed to support the jury's verdict that the officers did not use excessive
force when arresting the demonstrators. 87 The court arrived at this con-
clusion by employing the Graham Court's Fourth Amendment reasonable-
ness test.88 This test states that "the 'reasonableness' inquiry in an
excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether the of-
ficers' actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circum-
stances confronting them."89 This inquiry necessarily involves balancing
the individual's interest in freedom from unreasonable seizure against the
government's interest in effective law enforcement.90
Applying this test, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the evidence favored
the city of San Diego for two reasons.9 ' First, as compared to most other
excessive force claims, the nature and quality of the intrusion did not sig-
(citing White v. Pierce County, 797 F.2d 812, 816 (9th Cir. 1986)). Thus, the For-
rester court reviewed the jury's verdict to determine "whether it is supported by
substantial evidence, that is, such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Forrester, 25 F.3d at 806 (quoting
Eberle v. City of Anaheim, 901 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1990)).
85. Forrester, 25 F.3d at 807.
86. Id. at 809. The court also refused to grant each party's request for attor-
ney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). Id. at 808-09 (stating that
"[b] ecause the demonstrators have not procured relief modifying the city's behav-
ior, they are not prevailing parties. The demonstrators' action, however, is not so
meritless as to justify an award of fees to the city"); see Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct.
566, 573 (1992) (specifying that plaintiff must obtain enforceable judgment
against defendant from whom plaintiff seeks fees); Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755,
760 (1987) (same); Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980) (finding that con-
sent decree or settlement representing relief comparable to judgment for pur-
poses of obtaining attorneys); Elks Nat'l Found. v. Weber, 942 F.2d 1480, 1485 (9th
Cir. 1991) (stating that court may award fees aginst unsuccessful plaintiff only if
action is "meritless"), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1206 (1992). For a further discussion of
the court's rationale for not deciding the constitutionality of the pain compliance
policy, see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
87. Forrester, 25 F.3d at 807. The court noted that "[i]n addition to hearing
the testimony of numerous officers and demonstrators, the jury watched the entire
videotape of the arrests (and watched excerpts on repeated occasions)." Id.
88. Id. For a discussion of the Graham inquiry of reasonableness, see supra
notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
89. Id. at 806 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989)). For a
further discussion of this standard, see supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
90. Graham, 490 U.S. 396-97; Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1984).
For a further discussion of this topic, see supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
91. Forrester, 25 F.3d at 807.
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nificantly impact the arrestees' personal security. 9 2 Second, the city had a
legitimate interest in quickly dispersing and removing lawbreakers with a
minimal risk of injury to police and others.93 The court reasoned that
"[a]lthough many of these crimes were misdemeanors, the city's interest
in preventing their widespread occurrence was significant."94 Conse-
quently, the court concluded that the city's substantial interest in prevent-
ing organized lawlessness justified the measures that the police employed
in protecting themselves and others from potential injury.95
The Forrester court also dismissed the demonstrators' contention that
the pain compliance techniques represented an excessive use of force be-
cause "the drag and carry" method more reasonably accomplished the
city's goals. 96 The court maintained that the police officers need not use
the least intrusive degree of force necessary to control a crowd.97 Instead,
the court determined reasonableness by "viewing the facts from
the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene."98 Officers
92. Id. The court reasoned that "[t]he police did not threaten or use deadly
force and did not deliver physical blows or cuts. Rather, the force consisted only of
physical pressure administered on the demonstrators' limbs in increasing degrees,
resulting in pain." Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. The court cited the concurrence in Bray v. Alexandria Women's
Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993), where Justice Kennedy stated that "[t]he
wholesale commission of common state-law crimes creates dangers that are far
from ordinary. Even in the context of political protest, persistent, organized, pre-
meditated lawlessness menaces in a unique way the capacity of a State to maintain
order and preserve the rights of its citizens." Id. at 769 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
95. Forrester, 25 F.3d at 807. The court also noted that the police were 'justifi-
ably concerned about the risk of injury to the medical staff, patients of the clinic,




98. Id. at 807-08. According to the court, "[wlhether officers hypothetically
could have used less painful, less injurious, or more effective force in executing an
arrest is simply not the issue." Id. at 808; see Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396
(1989) (same); Hammer v. Gross, 932 F.2d 842, 846 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that
courts must judge reasonableness from perspective of reasonable officer on scene
rather than with 20/20 vision of hindsight). The Forrester court disagreed with the
demonstrators' contention that "actions of the subsequently arriving officers who
implemented the pain compliance policy are not relevant because those officers
could not have used the drag and carry method even if they thought it best to do
so." Forrester, 25 F.3d at 807 n.3. Moreover, the court stated:
Although Burgreen was not "on the scene" when he decided to imple-
ment the pain compliance policy, he based his decision on the antici-
pated circumstances of the demonstrations, which corresponded to the
actual circumstances the officers encountered. On the videotape, the
jury was able to observe the presence of factors indicating that pain com-
pliance techniques were in fact reasonable, including the demonstrators'
conduct, the officers' conduct, the size of the crowd, the presence of
other protesters, the manner in which force was applied, and the conse-
quences of that force.
1194 [Vol. 40: p. 1177
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have the discretion to use force and determine the degree of force to
employ.99
With respect to pain compliance, the court concluded that these of-
ficers used "minimal and controlled force in a manner designed to limit
injuries to all involved."10 0 As a result, the majority concluded that the
evidence supported the jury's verdict in favor of the city.10 1 Additionally,
the court concluded that it need not further inquire into the constitution-
ality of the city's pain compliance policy.102
B. Dissenting Opinion
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Kleinfeld disagreed with the majority's
holding that these pain compliance techniques constituted a reasonable
seizure.' 0 3 Judge Kleinfeld stated that the use of nunchakus against pas-
sive demonstrators represented conduct "unconstitutional as a matter of
law, because [the technique] was both ineffective and unnecessarily bru-
tal."10 4 Judge Kleinfeld concluded that these facts satisfied the objective
If this evidence were not sufficient, police departments could never
develop general policies for handling arrests. Neither Graham [v. Con-
nor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)] nor the Fourth Amendment compels us to
reach such an illogical conclusion.
Id.
99. Forrester, 25 F.3d at 808. The majority criticized the dissent's argument
that use of nunchakus represented unreasonable use of force, because it "inflicted
great pain and subsequent disability without directly accomplishing the purpose"
of forcing the demonstrators to walk. Id. at 808 n.4. The majority critized this
reasoning, stating that an "after-the-fact analysis violates the fundamental precept
of Graham; namely, '[t]he 'reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be
judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with
the 20/20 vision of hindsight.'" Id. (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396) (alterations
in original).
100. Id. at 808 (emphasis added). The majority rejected the dissent's compar-
ison of the pain compliance techniques to a hypothetical torture-by-lighted-ciga-
rette method. Id. at n.5. The court stated that such an analogy demonstrates a
misunderstanding of the pain compliance technique. Id. "Unlike the use of a
lighted cigarette, which would create immediate and searing pain, the discomfort
produced by the OPNs was gradual in nature .... [T]he dissent trivializes the risk
of injury (to both officers and demonstrators) inherent in 'drag and carry' removal
techniques ...." Id. Additionally, the jury's verdict "reflects the fact that a major
motivating factor.., of the pain compliance policy was prevention of injury to
existing officers." Id.
101. Id. at 809.
102. Id.
103. Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
104. Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). Judge Kleinfeld explained that the major-
ity opinion did not decide some important issues. Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
First, the court did not decide the constitutionality of the the pain compliance
olicy. See id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (indicating that court did nothing but af-
rm jury verdict below because enough evidence existed on which rational jurors
could have based verdict and that identical facts could have resulted in substantial
damage awards to demonstrators). Second, the court did not decide whether such
a policy infringed on the demonstrators' First Amendment rights. Id. (Kleinfeld,
1995] NOTE 119.5
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criteria in Graham.10 5 Judge Kleinfeld further asserted that, although the
demonstrators broke the law and the police rightfully arrested them, they
possessed the right to constitutional protection against unreasonable
force.10 6 Judge Kleinfeld methodically examined the case, applied the
Graham factors and concluded that the police did not use reasonable levels
of force against the demonstrators. 10 7
J., dissenting) (stating that demonstrators brought suit under Fourth Amendment
rather than First Amendment).
With regard to excessive force, "[iun one incident, [a demonstrator] . . .is
heard to plead with officers who are using the device to apply pressure to his wrists
that his passive resistance to them has ceased: 'I'm not limp any more... I'm not
limp any more ... I can't move my arm.'" SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 9, at 167.
In another incident,
[a] slight young man is brought to his feet by officers who have his armed
[sic] trapped at an awkward rear-facing angle. Suddenly, a crack is heard
and the man winces as his arm suddenlyjerks skyward. A female voice ...
is then heard to shout, "Oh, my God! They broke. that guy's arm!"
Id. at 166-67.
"In 1982," according to an LAPD training syllabus, the sixty-seven-
member "Thornton Police Department initiated a comprehensive one
year study implementing the OPN. With the successful completion of the
Thornton study, the Thornton Police Department adopted the OPN as its
primary and standard intermediate defensive and controlling instrument
in 1984."
Nowhere, however, does any document indicate that Thornton's po-
lice have ever used nunchakus on peaceful demonstrators. Nor, despite
selling the nunchakus to both the LAPD and San Diego and training a
group of LAPD instructors in their use, did Kevin Orcutt appear in court
to testify that using them against peaceful demonstrators was appropriate
or reasonable.
Id. at 166 (quoting Los Angeles Police Department, Orcutt Police Nunchaku
Arrest Control Tactics Course, Apr. 26, 1989, at 3). For a further discussion of
nunchakus, see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
105. Forrester, 25 F.3d at 809 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). Although courts
should not mechanically apply the Graham factors, courts cannot ignore these fac-
tors. Id. at 810 (Kleinfeld,J., dissenting) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,
396-97 (1989)); see White v. Pierce County, 797 F.2d 812, 816 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The
reasonableness of force is analyzed in light of such factors as the requirements for
the officer's safety, the motivation for the arrest, and the extent of the injury in-
flicted."). Judge Kleinfeld also asserted that "[t]he force used to hurt the demon-
strators was not reasonable for the severity of the crimes being committed, threat
to safety, or risk of flight." Forrester, 25 F.3d at 810 (Kleinfeld,J., dissenting). Judge
Kleinfeld noted that the police did not expect the infliction of pain to work effec-
tively in removing the demonstrators on their own power. Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dis-
senting). For a further discussion of the Graham test of objective reasonableness,
see supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
106. Forrester, 25 F.3d at 810 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting); see also Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (stating that "petitioner was entitled to the protection of the
Fourth Amendment as he walked down the street"). For a further discussion of
the rights protected under the Fourth Amendment, see supra notes 2-6 and accom-
panying text.
107. Forrester, 25 F.3d at 810-15 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). Judge Kleinfeld
broke down his analysis into different factors: "Split-Second Judgment," "Severity
of the crime," "Resistance to Arrest," "Immediate threat," "Ineffectiveness," and
"The Police Problem of Passive Resistance." Id.; cf. Terry, 392 U.S. at 28 (1968)
1196 [Vol. 40: p. 1177
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1. Split-Second Judgment
Judge Kleinfeld maintained that judging a split-second decision as
strictly as one made prior to the encounter results in unfairness. 10 8 None-
theless, the converse does not follow this rationale.10 9 "Police are not al-
lowed to use force which, 'judged from the perspective of a reasonable
officer on the scene,' is unreasonable, because.of a policy adopted without
the benefit of on-the-scene knowledge."1 10 Judge Kleinfeld compared the
pain compliance technique with the deadly force used in Tennessee v. Gar-
ner.11I He noted that Garner prohibited the use of deadly force against a
fleeing, unarmed felon. 11 2 Though Forrester did not involve the use of
deadly force, it did, according to Judge Kleinfeld, involve the use of "un-
reasonably disproportionate force."113 Thus, Judge Kleinfeld concluded
that "[t] he use of intensely painful yet ineffective force against demonstra-
tors engaged in completely passive resistance is always
unconstitutional."1 14
2. Severity of the Crime
Based on the facts surrounding this crime, Judge Kleinfeld asserted
that the use of relatively less force would support a reasonable level of
force.' 15 The amount of force used coincides with the level of force neces-
sary to combat more serious crimes.1 16 Judge Kleinfeld also attacked the
(discussing process of on-the-spot, split-second assessments by police in conducting
searches and seizures). In Terry, the Court ruled that the officer did not violate
petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable seizure. Id. at 29-30.
The officer "confined his search strictly to what was minimally necessary to learn
whether the men were armed and to disarm them once he discovered the weap-
ons." Id. at 30.
108. Forrester, 25 F.3d at 810 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
109. Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
110. Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (quoting Graham, 440 U.S. at 347). Judge
Kleinfeld drew an analogy with a hypothetical case in which "a police chief reason-
ably, in light of what was then known to him, instructed his officers with regard to
a hostage taker, 'if you get a clear shot, shoot to kill-he is armed and extremely
dangerous.'" Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). If an officer saw the suspect and
before shooting, ascertained with certainty that the suspect was not armed and
dangerous, that officer "could not reasonably shoot the suspect dead, despite the
policy decision made in advance." Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting); see Tennessee v.
Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (stating that statute authorizing police to use deadly
force to stop fleeing felon violated his constitutional rights if that suspect was un-
armed and nondangerous). The Garner Court rejected the notion that shooting
nondangerous fleeing suspects outweighs the suspect's interest in his own life. Id.
111. Forrester, 25 F.3d at 810-11 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). For a further dis-
cussion of Garner and the reasonable force analysis, see supra notes 2-6 and accom-
panying text.
112. Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 811 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
114. Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
115. Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
116. Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). Kleinfeld buttresses this statement with
Chief Burgreen's testimony that all the crimes involve misdemeanors. Id.
11971995] NOTE
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majority's use of appellate decisions to bolster its contentions. 117 Judge
Kleinfeld reasoned that by citing certain opinions, "the majority suggests a
higher degree.., of... crime."11 8 Judge Kleinfeld stated that the record
obligated the court to make a decision based on what the demonstrators
and the police did in this specific encounter.11 9
3. Resistance to Arrest
Judge Kleinfeld noted that " [t] he demonstrators did not 'actively' re-
sist arrest."120 Rather, the demonstrators passively resisted arrest by "sit-
ting instead of walking to the van, sometimes by crossing their legs, and in
one case, a woman had tied her legs together with string."'12 1 To support
this view, Judge Kleinfeld maintained that the Supreme Court's use of the
adverb "actively," in Graham, "could only be for the purpose of distinguish-
ing active from passive resistance., 122
117. Id. (Kleinfeld,J., dissenting). Specifically, Judge Kleinfeld stated that the
majority's use ofJustice Kennedy's concurrence and Justice O'Connor's dissent in
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993), represents a
"mistaken use of appellate judges' pronouncements." Forrester, 25 F.3d at 811
(Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). In Bray, Justice O'Connor, in dissent, argued that anti-
abortion protestors who blockaded entrances to clinics violated federal law by
preventing women from exercising their legal rights. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 773
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Kleinfeld believed the majority suggested a higher de-
gree of the "severity of the crime" by quoting from other cases dealing with Opera-
tion Rescue demonstrators. Forrester, 25 F.3d at 811 (Kleinfeld,J., dissenting). For
a further discussion of the cases quoted, see supra note 66 and accompanying text.
118. Forrester, 25 F.3d at 811 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). This perception that
anti-abortion protests constitute a higher crime than other similar activities per-
vades the media as well. See David Shaw, Abortion Foes Stereotyped, Some in the Media
Believe, L.A. TiME, July 2, 1990, at Al. "When abortion opponents picketed Turner
Broadcasting System [TBS] last summer to protest the showing of a film promot-
ing abortion rights, TBS Chairman Ted Turner called the demonstrators 'bozos'
and 'idiots.'" Id. Many in the anti-abortion movement feel that Turner's senti-
ment reflects the attitude within the media. Id. " 'Opposing abortion, in the eyes
of most journalists ... is not a legitimate, civilized position in our society,' " says
Ethan Bronner, a Boston Globe legal affairs reporter, who spent much of 1989 writ-
ing about abortion. Id. One pro-life supporter comments that "[r)eporters even
try to perpetuate that stereotype... by asking [abortion foes] to make sure you
look angry . . .when [they are] being interviewed on television." Id. Abortion
opponents contend the media further stereotypes them by labeling all such protes-
ters as conservatives. Id. David Shribman of the Wall StreetJournal, who has spent
about 40% of his time writing about abortion in 1990, says the anti-abortion move-
ment represents "one of the broadest political coalitions in American history." Id.
Journalists insist they try to be fair to both sides, no matter how they feel about
the people they cover. Much of the time, they are fair." Id.
119. Forrester, 25 F.3d at 811 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). "The parties stipulated
and the jury was instructed that 'each plaintiff was arrested for trespass and/or
failure to disperse from an unlawful assembly.' " Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (ci-
tation omitted).
120. Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
121. Id. (KleinfeldJ., dissenting).
122. Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386
(1989), the Court stated that the Fourth Amendment's
1198
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4. Immediate Threat
Judge Kleinfeld asserted that the "immediate threat" to the safety of
officers or others would justify the use of force.12 3 Even an immediate
threat, however, would not support the levels of force used by these of-
ficers. 124 As stipulated, the facts illustrate the police's expectation that
"the demonstrators 'would likely be people who were neither dangerous
nor people who would attempt to actively resist being forcibly removed
from the premises.' "125 The parties also stipulated that "none of the
plaintiffs threatened, struck or physically attacked any of the officers.' 26
The most compelling evidence of "immediate threat" to the safety of the
officers involved the potential danger of back and leg injuries if the of-
ficers employed the "drag or carry" method of arresting the
demonstrators. 1
2 7
The second threat to safety entailed the need to effectuate quick ar-
rests. 128 Judge Kleinfeld noted that the police, however, did not carry
proper application requires careful attention to the facts and circum-
stances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at is-
sue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the
officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting
to evade arrest by flight.
Id. at 396 (emphasis added). For a further discussion of this issue, see supra notes
2-6 and accompanying text.
123. Forrester, 25 F.3d at 811 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting); cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 15 (1968) (ruling that "courts still retain their traditional responsibility to
guard against police conduct which is overbearing or harassing, or which trenches
upon personal security without the objective evidentiary justification which the
Constitution requires").
124. Forrester, 25 F.3d at 811 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
125. Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
126. Id. (Kleinfeld,J., dissenting). Chief Burgreen also characterized the Op-
eration Rescue demonstrators in the instant case as "people who profess to be law
abiding people and are law abiding people in every other sense of the word." Id.
(Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). Additionally, videotapes of the demonstrators estab-
lished that they did not actively or violently resist arrest in any way. Id. (Kleinfeld,
J., dissenting).
127. Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). Chief Burgreen testified that in the 1960s
and 1970s, the leading cause of police disability was back injuries incurred during
the operation of police ambulances. Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). He did not
believe his female or small male officers could sufficiently carry demonstrators,
even with four to six officers on each person. Id. at 811-12 ("We don't have the
luxury of having everybody six feet tall and 200 pounds and physically can handle
themselves and carry their own weight." (statement of Police Chief Burgeen)).
128. Id. at 812 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). The Police Chief testified that
"[w]hat we had was several types-a couple hundred people on both sides who
were a very, very, volatile issue [sic]. They were very emotional and you had every-
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their batons and did not wear face shields or helmets. 129 Therefore, the
officers did not believe the demonstrators posed any kind of threat.'3 0
5. Ineffectiveness
Judge Kleinfeld contended that the arrests in Forrester demonstrated a
"painful, yet ineffective" use of police force.' 3 1 The pain compliance tech-
nique did not force the demonstrators off the premises under their own
power. 132 According to Judge Kleinfeld, "[t]o be reasonable, force has to
be designed to accomplish a legitimate objective efficiently."' 33 Under
the circumstances, Judge Kleinfeld concluded that the police conduct did
not constitute a reasonable use of force because the pain compliance tech-
nique failed to facilitate speedy arrests, failed to protect the police from
back and leg injuries and caused severe pain and injuries to the individual
demonstrators. 13 4
6. The Police Problem of Passive Resistance
Finally, Judge Kleinfeld articulated the reasons why a civilized society
tolerates demonstrations and the concomitant law enforcement obliga-
129. Id. at 813 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
130. Id. (Kleinfeld,J., dissenting); cf. Eberle v. City of Anaheim, 901 F.2d 814,
820 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that "explosive and potentially dangerous situation"
reasonably called for officer to apply fingerhold to appellant). Judge Kleinfeld
stated that the threat "resembles the one among football fans in [Eberle], although
it lacks the beer-throwing, kicking and pushing which exacerbated the situation in
that case." Forrester, 25 F.3d at 812-13.
131. Forrester, 25 F.3d at 813 (Kleinfeld,J., dissenting). The dissent compares
the situation to the one in Eberle and distinguishes the two by indicating that the
force in Eberle represented effective but not painful force. Id. (Kleinfeld, J.,
dissenting).
132. Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). In fact, a nunchakus training officer told
police that "most of the time they'll sit there and scream because it does in fact
hurt but they won't move, so you'll have to follow up with some kind of control
hold." Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). Evidence also existed that the technique
caused permanent damage. Id. (Kleinfeld,J., dissenting). For a further discussion
of pain compliance, see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
Additionally, a 125-pound female demonstrator testified that "I was trying to
get up, but it hurt so much that I couldn't-at least for awhile I couldn't get up
.... I was crying and I kept feeling like I was going to pass out and it was just really
difficult to walk." Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (quoting testimony of Ms. Jenkins,
demonstrator) (alterations in original). Another female commented, "the pain
'was so bad I couldn't see .... I almost lost consciousness and I fell on the other
officer.' " Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (alterations in original).
133. Id. (Kleinfeld,J., dissenting). Judge Kleinfeld stated that "[t]he objective
was to make the demonstrators move from where they were seated to the vans. But
the force was not used to move the demonstrators into the vans. It was used to
punish them for refusing to get up and walk to the vans." Id. (Kleinfeld, J.,
dissenting).
134. Id. (Kleinfeld,J., dissenting). "Use of pain is not constitutionally prohib-
ited, but [its use] is limited by the Fourth [Amendment] ....... Id. at 814(Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). As Judge Kleinfeld stated: "[w]hether the force works
bears on its reasonableness." Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
1200 [Vol. 40: p. 1177
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tions flowing from this tolerance.13 5 Judge Kleinfeld placed a high degree
of importance on the freedom to protest and implicitly concluded that
society should not curtail its ability to express discontent.13 6
V. THE FRRESTER COURT DID NOT PROPERLY APPLY THE
. REASONABLENESS STANDARD
The majority court in Forrester analyzed the case under Graham's rea-
sonableness test.13 7 By employing this balancing test enunciated in Gra-
ham and other previous Supreme Court rulings,1 38 the Ninth Circuit
weighed the competing interests of the individual and the government to
determine the reasonableness of particular police actions.1 3 9
135. Id. at 814-15 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). Judge Kleinfeld concluded,
"[t]he intentional infliction of severe pain during an arrest of a passively resisting
demonstrator, when it is not incidental to an efficient means of making the arrest,
is inconsistent with those values." Id. at 815 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). "While we
value law and order, we value individual liberty and compassion so profoundly that
we tolerate a good deal of disorder, and are lenient, compared to many regimes,
about lesser violations of law." Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
136. Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (stating "[p] assive resistance tests our level
of civilization"). In recent years, police have displayed a growing animus toward
Operation Rescue demonstrators:
In San Diego, an officer reportedly moved through the demonstrators
singing: "Don't try to understand 'em,just round 'em up and brand 'em."
In Pittsburgh, women claimed they were sexually molested by officers. In
West Hartford, Connecticut, officers removed their badges and name
tags-purportedly to avoid cutting demonstrators-and then allegedly
hauled protesters away with come-along holds, by lifting them with sharp-
edged plastic handcuffs, or with "crotch carries" in which a night stick is
stuck between the protester's legs. A priest testified that the police
seemed to enjoy inflicting pain: "The demonic element entered in here."
Bob Sipchen, Politics, Pain and the Police, LA. TIMEs, Jan. 8, 1990, at Al.
137. Forrester, 25 F.3d at 806. This test provided the proper framework to de-
termine the reasonableness of force used to effectuate an arrest. Graham v. Con-
nor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989); see Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1985)
(ruling that reasonableness must be determined by totality of circumstances); Scott
v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136-38 (1978) (ruling that officers' actions should
first be evaluated in light of facts and circumstances without regard to their under-
lying intent or motivation); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (stating that rea-
sonableness of particular search must be judged against objective standard). For a
further discussion of the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement, see
supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
138. See, e.g., United States v. P lace, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) (stating that
courts must employ balancing test weighing competing interests of government
and individual); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 n.12 (1981) (same); Scott,
436 U.S. at 138 (same); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)
(same); Teny, 392 U.S. at 22-25; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37
(1967) (same).
139. Forrester, 25 F.3d at 807; see Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (stating
"[d]etermining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is 'reasonable'
under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of 'the nature and
quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests.' " (cita-
tion omitted)); Garner, 471 U.S. at 8 (holding that one must balance nature and
quality of intrusion on individual's Fourth Amendment interests against govern-
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Applying this test, the Ninth Circuit incorrectly upheld the reasona-
bleness of the pain compliance force used against the Operation Rescue
demonstrators. 140 The Garner and Graham balancing tests mandate that
courts consider the totality of the circumstances in making a reasonable-
ness determination. 141 Consequently, the dissent's evaluation of the com-
peting interests more faithfully adheres to the Supreme Court's protection
of Fourth Amendment interests than does the majority's analysis of these
interests.1 42
1. No Immediate Threat
In Garner, the Court stated that "[w]here the suspect poses no imme-
diate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from
failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do
so."1 43 Although the police in Forrester did not use deadly force, Garner's
central message provides that police officers should use only that level of
force commensurate with the danger threatened by the alleged crime. 44
In light of Garner, "Itlhe use of intensely painful, yet ineffective, force
ment interest in intrusion); see also SKOLNICK & FVFE, supra note 9, at 101 (discuss-
ing how Court recognized that application of force implicated specific Fourth or
Eighth Amendment rights and applied standard developed to protect that right).
140. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 8-11 (stating that deadly force represents unrea-
sonable force when used against nondangerous fleeing felon); Terry, 392 U.S. at 9-
10 (ruling that inestimable right of personal security belongs to citizen). Supreme
Court rulings have placed an individual's interest on a high level. Id. "No right is
held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right
of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of
law." Id. (quoting Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251
(1891)).
Applying the principles in Graham and Garner, the Court has held that govern-
mental interests did not support a lengthy detention of luggage. United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709-10 (1983). The Court also held that government interests
did not support an airport seizure not "carefully tailored to its underlying justifica-
tion." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion). In another
case, the Court found that governmental interests did not support surgery under
general anesthesia to obtain evidence. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 763-66
(1985). Additionally, the Court ruled that government interests did not support
detention for fingerprinting without probable cause. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S.
811, 813-16 (1985); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 724-28 (1969). Finally, the
Court held that governmental interests did not support the use of deadly force to
stop a fleeing, nondangerous felon. Garner, 471 U.S. at 10.
141. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97; Garner, 471 U.S. at 8-9. For a further discus-
sion of the reasonableness determination, see supra notes 2-6 and accompanying
text.
142. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 11 ("The use of deadly force to prevent the escape
of all felony suspects, whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally
unreasonable.").
143. Id.
144. See id. (stating that police may only use deadly force if suspect threatens
officer with weapon or if suspect has committed crime involving infliction of seri-
ous harm). The Court emphasized that "[i]t is not better that all felony suspects
die than that they escape." Id. Before the Garner decision, "police in about half
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against" passively resisting demonstrators always constitutes unreasonable
force. 145 Because the demonstrators in Forrester posed no threat to the
officers or others during the "sit-ins," police use of pain compliance force
against the demonstrators, resulting in severe pain and injuries, violated
the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 146
2. Balancing Test Favored the Demonstrators
The balancing test employed by the Supreme Court requires a weigh-
ing of the government's and the arrestee's competing interests.1 4 7 In Gar-
ner, the Court indicated that it "would hesitate to declare a police practice
of long standing 'unreasonable' if doing so would severely hamper effec-
tive law enforcement. 1 48 Accordingly, courts should consider how a pro-
hibition on pain compliance would impact effective law enforcement. 149
If pain compliance techniques represent the only effective means of mak-
ing arrests, the use of such techniques appear reasonable. As the evidence
indicates in Forrester, however, ineffective pain compliance techniques will
likely inflict severe pain and injuries.' 5 0
the states were authorized to use deadly force to apprehend all 'fleeing felony'
suspects." SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 9, at 41.
145. See Forrester v. City of San Diego, 25 F.3d 804, 810-11 (9th Cir. 1994)
(Kleinfeld, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1104 (1995). According to one
reporter,
[d]emonstrators have alleged police brutality at least since Freedom Rid-
ers launched their sit-down strikes in Alabama almost 30 years ago. This
time, however, the outcry-including the videotapes of police in action-
comes from anti-abortion protesters with Operation Rescue, whose mem-
bers tend to see themselves as law-and-order conservatives.
Sipchen, supra note 136, at Al.
146. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 11 (stating "[w] here the suspect poses no immedi-
ate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to
apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so"). Thus, force
must match the threatened danger to the police. Id. For a further discussion of
the injuries sustained by the demonstrators in facts similar to Forrester, see supra
note 104 and accompanying text.
147. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (stating that courts must
carefully balance competing interests). For a discussion of the balancing test, see
supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
148. Garner, 471 U.S. at 19.
149. Id.; see SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 9, at 39-40 (stating "[c]ops are
trained in a variety of come-along holds-hammerlocks, wristlocks, finger grips, and
the like-which are very useful in breaking up bar fights and domestic battles and
in arresting demonstrators whose protests have gone beyond mere passive resist-
ance") (emphasis added). Skolnick and Fyfe comment that "[t] he primary police
obligation-to protect life-dictates that they not put themselves in harm's way to
avoid using an appropriate degree of force." Id. For a discussion of federal penal-
ties against police departments that employ excessive force, see supra notes 38-41
and accompanying text.
150. Forrester, 25 F.3d at 809 (stating that after applying pain compliance to
demonstrator and realizing that it did not compel demonstrator to rise to her feet,
the "police officer grabbed her by her hair and back of her pants, and pulled her
to her feet"). LAPD officials have argued that nunchakus allowed for speedier
removal of demonstrators. SKOLNICK- & FFE, supra note 9, at 167. "The tapes,
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The court must consider "the severity of the crime at issue, whether
the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or
others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade
arrest by flight in evaluating the appropriate amount of police force."
1 5 1
Although this list does not exhaust all factors which a court may consider,
these factors represent the items that the Supreme Court deemed most
critical. 152 The court in Forrester did not evaluate these three factors. 153
As Police Chief Burgreen testified, the crimes lacked seriousness,' 54 the
officers did not receive verbal or physical threats15 5 and the demonstrators
did not actively resist arrest. 156
3. Pain Compliance Constitutes Excessive Force
The Supreme Court has traditionally emphasized an individual's per-
sonal dignity interests in the context of arrests or seizures. 157 In Terry v.
Ohio, the Court stated that "it is simply fantastic to urge" that holding a
suspect against a wall with his hands up constitutes "petty indignity;"
rather, "[i] t is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person."' 58 Sim-
ilarly, pain compliance techniques represent a direct violation of a per-
son's self-esteem in that they attempt to "overcome the composure and
self-control of the arrestee and act to reduce the person to tears and often
however, show teams of three to five officers awkwardly and haltingly walking, half-
draggging, and carrying off writhing demonstrators one at a time in what is hardly
efficient assembly line process." Id.
151. Graham 490 U.S. at 396; see Garner, 471 U.S. at 3 (concluding that deadly
force "may not be used unless it is necessary to prevent the escape and the officer
has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or
serious physical injury to the officer or others").
152. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 7-9 (stating that totality of circumstances and ex-
tent of intrusion also constitute factors); id. at 15-19 (stating that prevailing rules
in individual jurisdictions also represent factors).
153. Forrester, 25 F.3d at 805-09.
154. Id. at 811 (Kleinfeld,J., dissenting). "The stipulated facts in this case put
the crimes toward the low end of severity, so less force was reasonable than for
more serious crimes." Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
155. See id. at 805-06 (finding that facts fail to indicate verbal or physical
threats by demonstrators toward police officers). The only apparent threat to the
police officers involved the possible back injuries which they might have sustained
as a result of carrying and dragging the demonstrators to the vans. Id.
156. See id. (noting that facts do not indicate demonstrators' use of active
resistance). The majority contends the Supreme Court did not limit the inquiry to
just these factors and emphasized that the jury should consider "whether the total-
ity of the circumstances justifies a particular sort of seizure." Id. at 806 n.2 (quot-
ing Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1985)). The majority further argues that
the dissent uses a "rigid three-part inquiry." Id.
157. SeeTerryv. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968) (discussing individual dignity in
pat-down search for weapons); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 700-01 (1983)
(emphasizing importance of personal privacy in luggage search); Whipple, supra
note 9, at 192-94 (discussing "sanctity of the person" as pertaining to arrests or
seizures).
158. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-17.
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screams of agony."' 59 As evidence of such indignity, pain compliance
techniques have caused extreme pain, broken bones, pinched nerves and
excessive humiliation.16 0 Prior Supreme Court decisions suggest that non-
violent demonstrations should entitle an individual to nonviolent arrest
techniques.'6 1 If the police use extremely violent measures, the govern-
ment's interests must override the sanctity of individual rights.' 62
In Forrester, the city's interests include effectuating arrests and
preventing injuries to the police officers and to others.16 3 The police
should only use force when it represents the most reasonable way to ac-
complish these objectives. 164 In Forrester, the pain compliance technique
did not constitute the most efficient way to effectuate the demonstrators'
159. Whipple, supra note 9, at 193 (citing Plaintiff's Supplemental Opening
Memorandum in Support of Order to Show Cause re: Preliminary Injunction, at 2-
3, John v. City of Los Angeles, No. 89-4766 AWT (C.D. Cal. July 17, 1991) [herein-
after Plaintiff's Supplemental Opening Memorandum] (stating that demonstrator was
"completely picked up and suspended off the ground by defendant's police of-
ficers as he was carried to the bus while screaming in agony")).
160. Forrester, 25 F.3d at 814 (Kleinfeld,J., dissenting) ("Chief Burgreen testi-
fied that he expected the demonstrators to suffer abrasions, strained ligaments
and strained tendons, with a possibility of broken bones. They did suffer all those
injuries."). Also, one author described a videotape of another demonstration
which very graphically and audibly showed a demonstrator's arm snapping from
the officers' use of excessive force. SKOLNICK & FYF, supra note 9, at 166. For a
description of this incident, see supra note 104. "(P] rotesters in Los Angeles and
elsewhere assert that the nunchakus and more conventional come-along holds pro-
duced not only agony while being applied, but lingering pain, broken bones, torn
ligaments, and, in some cases, long-lasting nerve damage." Sipchen, supra note
136, at Al. Consequently, these protestors have filed lawsuits against police in Los
Angeles, Sacramento, Atlanta and other cities. Id.
161. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (stating officers must
act in "objectively reasonable" manner in light of facts and circumstances con-
fronting them); see also Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) (stating
that officers acted in "objectively reasonable" manner in light of facts and circum-
stances confronting them); cf Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (ruling that officer must justify
particular intrusion by pointing to specific and articulable facts which reasonably
warrant that intrusion).
162. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (ruling that sufficient
government interest involves protecting officers and others from death or serious
bodily injury); Whipple, supra note 9, at 194 (stating that "[o]fficers are authorized
to use force when their safety is threatened").
163. Forrester, 25 F.3d at 807. "The police are of course charged with the gov-
ernmental duty of enforcing the law and are empowered to use force if necessary."
Whipple, supra note 9, at 194; see also Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (recognizing that
right to make arrest or investigatory stop necessarily involves some degree of physi-
cal coercion or threat thereof to effect it); Terry, 392 U.S. at 22-27 (stating standard
as "whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in
the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger").
164. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (stating that police must apply force reason-
ably hinging on severity of crime at issue, immediacy of threat to that officer or
others and extent of resistance to arrest).
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arrests successfully.' 65 Although the technique caused the demonstrators
to suffer pain, it did not, by itself, induce the demonstrators to walk from
the premises voluntarily. 166 Eventually, the police officers resorted to pull-
ing the demonstrators onto their feet. 167 Because the technique lacked
effectiveness and produced unnecessarily brutal results, it did not consti-
tute a reasonable method of removing the demonstrators.16 8
In addition, data illustrating that other jurisdictions have successfully
used other methods to deal with demonstrators contradicts the necessity
of using pain compliance techniques. 69 While alternative methods do
not completely eliminate the need to engage in some lifting, one police
department does not believe pain compliance techniques represent the
best method.170 One successful way to minimize police injury involves us-
ing carrying devices similar to those used by ambulance squads.' 7 1 "The
Metropolitan Police Department of Washington, D.C., . . . a force
'uniquely experienced in the handling of demonstrations,' " has success-
fully employed this method of removing demonstrators. 172 In the hot
political climate of the nation's capital, the officers in the District of Co-
lumbia must police many demonstrations and protests. This example
demonstrates that the police can effectively administer alternative removal
methods while minimizing the risk of injury to arresting officers.' 7 3
165. Forrester, 25 F.3d at 809 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). In fact, most demon-
strators could not move off the premises because they sufferred from severe pain.
Id. at 813 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 813 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). In one instance, the arresting of-
ficers applied nunchakus around a female demonstrator's wrists and as they began
to twist the device, she moved from a sitting position to a position on her knees
and began screaming. Id. at 809 (Kleinfeld,J., dissenting). The officers continued
to twist, but the technique did not cause her to stand up and walk. Id. (Kleinfeld,
J., dissenting). In fact, the officers had to grab her hair and the back of her pants,
and pull her up on her feet to get her to walk off the premises. Id. (Kleinfeld, J.,
dissenting).
167. Id. at 809 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
168. Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). Judge Kleinfeld noted that
[w]hile pain compliance techniques may make it unnecessary for an of-
ficer to lift a passive arrestee, that result is not guaranteed. In practice, it
turns out that "the use of the nunchakus [does] not eliminate nor even
thwart the necessity for the officer[s] to drag and lift the demonstrators
.... In fact, there [are] those who [are] immobilized by the pain compli-
ance techniques."
Whipple, supra note 9, at 194 (quoting Plaintiff's Supplemental Opening Memoran-
dum, supra note 159, at 31-32).
169. See Whipple, supra note 9, at 194-96 (describing effective alternative
methods to pain compliance).
170. Id. at 194-95.
171. Id. Whipple points out that by using safety-conscious techniques and car-
rying devices, police may remove demonstrators without harming them. Id.
172. Id. at 195 n.112 (quoting Allegations, supra note 39, at 16).
173. Id. at 195.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Under a proper application of the reasonableness test, the Forrester
court would have held that, in the context of passive demonstrations, San
Diego's "pain compliance" policy violates the Fourth Amendment. 174 The
Supreme Court's strong emphasis on individual rights mandates that po-
lice employ only that level of force necessary to perfect an arrest.175 Any-
thing more constitutes excessive force, which the Constitution
prohibits. 176
By employing Graham's balancing test, the arrestee's interests out-
weighed the government's need to employ the pain compliance force. 177
The severity of the pain, injury and humiliation associated with the tech-
nique also offsetted the exigencies of the situation or any overriding gov-
ernment interests.17 8 In other jurisdictions, alternative and less intrusive
methods have produced more effective law enforcement results.1 79
The consequences of Forrester might have far-reaching implications.
For example, the decision could significantly curtail an individual's right
to freedom from unreasonable force. Police officers may wield unbridled
discretion in employing severe pain compliance techniques against indi-
viduals who commit minor legal infractions. Moreover, police depart-
ments across the country might apply the techniques to a wide array of
arrest situations. A trend toward heightened police abuse and concomi-
tant public disdain for law enforcement may stem from this practice.' 80
In addition to escalating police violence, this policy may significantly
impact a group's right to gather and demonstrate. The violence associ-
ated with these gatherings may deter many potential demonstrators from
participating. Consequently, this potential violence would greatly reduce
citizens' ability to voice their opinion, displeasure or support for causes or
ideals. This chilling effect on First Amendment rights represents another
factor in a complete analysis of this topic.
Ultimately, Forrester, or cases similar to Forrester, may come before the
Supreme Court for review. In view of the applicable factors and the
Court's historic support for individual rights, the Court will likely hold
174. For a discussion of the reasonableness test, see supra notes 2-6 and ac-
companying text.
175. For a further discussion of this issue of perfection, see supra notes 2-6
and accompanying text.
176. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989) (stating officers'
must act objectively reasonable in light of facts and circumstances confronting
them).
177. For a further discussion of the balancing test, see supra notes 2-6 and
accompanying text.
178. For a further discussion of the injuries sustained by the demonstrators,
see supra note 104 and accompanying text.
179. For a discussion of how alternative and less intrusive methods have
proven more effective in other jurisdictions, see supra note 171.
180. For a further discussion of the injuries resulting from police use of pain
compliance force, see supra note 104.
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